Accession of Turkey into the European Union? Turkey's religious freedom challenge.

Situation of the Greek minority in Turkey This study will examine the issues of religious freedom in Turkey under the doctrine of secularism adopted following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Since, most of the religious minorities, including its Islamic minorities, have been described by the popular majority, Sunni, as anti-Turkish. Alevis, Kurds, and Christians are limited in their official recognition by the Turkish state and have limited ability to organize their religious life. The question that caused me to discuss this issue is, why is "secular" Turkey fostering aspirations of entering the EU, all the while working closely with the United States, both predominantly Christian, and at the same time obliterating its own Christian minority population? In this paper I will seek to present an argument highlighting the deliberate attempt to exterminate religious minorities by Turkish Authorities. This is proceeding as at the same time Turkey, an Islamic state, is actively pursuing the European Union (EU), commonly viewed as a Christian "club," to admit Turkey as one of its member states. Secularism in Turkey Since the republican revolution of 1923, Islam in Turkey has been redefined, "the Ataturkist innovation was to bring Islamic authority under the full and absolute control of the secular state." The institutionalization of secularism involved bringing all religious activity under the direct control of the secular state. In 1924 a Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was formed to act as the ultimate authority on the knowledge and practice of Islam in Turkey. Although Turkey proclaims itself to be a secular state, its Constitution (article 24) maintains that "Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control,... instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory." The state supported religion is Sunni Islam, any form of Christianity, or any other non-Islam religions, is viewed as anti-Turkish behavior. Formation of the Turkish state and its relations with Greece "1071, the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes and began the conquest of the present-day territory of Turkey; 1453, when the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II conquered the Byzantine capital of Constantinople; 1821, when the Greeks in present-day Greece rose against their Ottoman rulers and set about building the modern Greek national state; 1919, when the armies of that national state attempted to conquer western Turkey; 1922-1923, when that attempt was defeated and a population exchange ended the cohabitation of Greeks and Turks, except in Turkish Istanbul, Greek western Thrace, and British-ruled Cyprus". Article 1 of the Lausanne Convention defined those who must leave: from Turkey, Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox religion; and from Greece, Greek nationals of Muslim religion. As a consequence, according to Hirschorn (2003), "344,635 Muslim-Turks were expelled from Greece for Turkey, and 189,916 Rum Orthodox were expelled from Turkey for Greece. Socio-political consequences of the exchange were enormous and hard to bear on both sides, especially for the weakened Greece and its minority in Turkey. In the post-Lausanne period, Turkey and Greece were occupied with building nation-states, "the distinctive feature of which was the emphasis on an ethnically homogenous population." It is for this reason that so much stress is laid on the distinction in Turkey between Greek Orthodox (Rum Ortodoks) and Greek (Yunanli), i.e., national of the Greek State. Religions of Turkey and the lack of Religious Freedom. Religion, freedom, and practice are fundamental in the organization of society. From the doctrinal point of view, the Turkish Islamic population is in itself divided into two large groups, Sunni and Alevi. The above dichotomy alone is potentially great risk, and, when realized, will cause Turkey extreme instability. One of the distinguishing marks of this tradition was the relation of religion and state. As explained by Berkes (1964), "in Islam there were no concepts of church and state as specifically religious and political institutions. Religion and state were believed to be fused together; the state was conceived as the embodiment of religion, and religion as the essence of the state." Religion besides its theological and redeeming application is also an effective tool in the political arsenal and religious convictions often are a driving force of political struggle. Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks coexisted in much greater harmony, though not without conflicts, under Ottoman rule. When Turkey became a "secular" state, religious and national lines were revealed and emphasized, then the extermination and dramatic decline in relations began. Although, blasphemy against any "divine religion" (in effect the religions of the Peoples of the Book - Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and "Sabaeanism" - as defined in the Qur'an) is an offense, Greek and Armenian Christianity is viewed as a form of (anti-Turkish) Greek and Armenian nationalism, posing a potential risk for the Turkish state. This sentiment is promoted while Turkey aspires to join the EU. Educated opinion in Turkey has been divided as to the depth of people's commitment to secularism, and whether or not Turkey could ever experience an 'Islamic Revolution'. Turkish republicanism/nationalism, and Turkish Islam today are both expressions of a single underlying ideology of social control. In a secular country like America, the church and state are separate; in Turkey it's the opposite - the state controls the mosque. The Religious Affairs Department personnel are government employees. Present situation of religious minority in Turkey. The case of Greek Orthodox. There are an estimated 12 million Alevis, a heterodox Muslim sect, forming the largest religious minority oppressed by the Turkish regime. Some Turkish Alevis even maintain they are not Muslims. While exact membership figures are not available, these include an estimated 50,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians; 25,000 Jews; and from 3,000 to 5,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. Throughout time the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey had been sharply reduced by the mass population exchange with Greece under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Most of the remaining Greeks fled in 1955, following anti-Greek riots. At the Lausanne Conference, the international community allowed some relatively small minority groups in Greek Thrace, Istanbul and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos to escape the ensuing population exchange. Inter-communal disturbances in Cyprus and the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations during the 1960s had a direct impact on the Greek Orthodox in Turkey. The Istanbul Orthodox with Greek citizenship were the first group to be affected when on 16 March 1964 Turkey unilaterally denounced the Greek-Turkish Convention of Establishment of 1930, even though the right of these people to remain in their native city was guaranteed by the 1923 Lausanne agreement. By 1967, almost the whole Istanbul Hellene community had been expelled and their assets in Turkey frozen. By contrast in Greece, a total of 287 mosques and 460 Muslim clerics are testimony to the intensely religious character of the Thracian minority. Of principal importance to the deeply religious Orthodox minority in Istanbul and these of the islands, as well as to the Orthodox believers world wide is the fate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. There are only small numbers of Roman Catholic Christians in Turkey therefore the Roman Catholic Church's interests there are minimal. Civilization lines as described by Huntington (1996), between Islamic, Eastern Orthodox, and Western Civilizations are becoming pronounced on this issue. Even today, as Turkey strives toward EU accession talks, Greeks claim that a new proposal in Turkish law continues discrimination against religious minorities. All of the property of the Greek communities of Istanbul - their churches, monasteries, schools, community centers and other communal real estate - by law are owned by minority foundations that fall under the authority of the state's General Directorate of Foundations (GDF) in Ankara. A 1935 law required minorities to register all their foundation properties in the land registry. The European Commission's last report on Turkey's progress, in October 2004, noted the deficiencies of new laws in so far as protecting minority properties. The territory of Turkey is a historical, geographical, and political bridge between occidental and oriental worlds that encompass religions and cultures. The practice of "religious repression in Turkey presents concern reinforced by the existence of broader cleavages between Orthodox and Muslim communities elsewhere in the Balkans." For some time now, Turkey has been making an attempt to redefine itself in the image of a western state. Contrary to Samuel Huntington opinion, I believe, that upon completing the process of conversion into a western society, Turkey will maintain a very strong Islamic identity. Especially if, or rather when, Turkey will enter the EU, a polity with a liberal stance toward religious practice and choice, extremist Islamic movement within Turkey and throughout the EU will be on the rise. As Berkes concludes, "the transformation of Turkey from a traditional Islamic to a secular state illustrates the complex relations between economic and technical changes, and political and religious changes." The religious minorities support of Turkey's accession into the EU in hope of the change of the conditions in which they live and practice their faith. Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of the Orthodox Christians world-wide, headquartered in Istanbul, old-day Constantinople, actively presents his message of coexistence and mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims. There is no such dialog taking place in Turkey however. Some other facts, especially bothersome to the largest EU member states as mentioned in the Economist are: Turkey, which has 71 million inhabitants and is growing, would be the largest EU country, overtaking Germany in roughly 2020. The fears on the part of secularists in Turkey and the EU may be realized when religious freedom of the EU will enter Turkey, than the Islamists, of Turkey and of the EU, may pose an unprecedented modern era threat to the social and political stability of the new EU. That desired freedom can potentially be too much to handle for both sides, the EU and Turkey. That desired freedom can potentially be too much to handle for both sides, the EU and Turkey. Largely, however, this arrangement failed to safeguard the rights of minorities as is amply attested to by the near complete disappearance of the Greek Orthodox Community within Turkey. The complexity of the religious issue in Turkey today is emphasized by xenophobic, anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic, reactions by some of their political parties. Considering the latest events in world affairs, however, this will be unlikely because the US needs Turkey as a cooperative ally more than it cares about freedom of religion throughout the world; as is evident in the case of China's religious freedom, and economic development dual standards. Its own needs, and the US, may hard press the EU into making Turkey's accession possible without developing of a proven track record toward improving the status of its religious minorities. Also important, especially to the question at hand, are Turkish-Greek relations which are concentrated on treatment of religious minorities, residual Turkish Greek and Armenian Orthodox population, which can not operate their own, non-Islamic schools, and lately, as presented above, are assessed back property taxes leading to the confiscation of their property, primarily churches, by state. Eventually Turkey is going to join the EU, and the risk of Pan-Arabic sentiment may come to the forefront of Turkey's agenda. There are great risks involved raising subsequent questions: Does Turkey's government use secularism as means to control conservative Muslim factions exclusively in order to prevent conflict between militant believers and proponents of a secular state? If so, is Turkey another Yugoslavia just waiting to implode? For now, Turkey's Machiavellian approach toward religious minorities seems to work, but should the political control mechanisms be removed, Alevis, Kurds, and proponents of the Ottoman style rule will taste the environment allowing freedom of religious expression, which will most certainly, trigger new division lines leading to power struggle between groups and revive irredentist claims. For individual citizens of Turkey, and for Islam, the questions: if and when Turkey will join the EU is not critical, because even without official membership in the EU Turkish citizens are forming a substantial part of the "Old" European society. With "Old' European populations on the decline, within the next few decades, regardless of Turkey's official membership in the EU, immigrants from Middle East and North Africa, mostly Muslim, will form a significant part of Europe's population. The EU citizenry has strong reasons to be frightened of Turkish population expansion westwards because of social and political price, and religious contrast. Although Turkey seams to be inching toward political and economic stability, the areas of cultural and religious tolerance do not reflect improvement and pose a great risk for the EU. The structure mechanism to safeguard the religious rights of Turkey's minorities are necessary today, to allow minorities freedom to practice their religion, to maintain their institutions and property, and to provide education for young generations. Unlike Alevis, Greeks and Armenians are token minorities not posing any political danger. Until now, the desire of Turkey to join the EU keeps superficial order, motivates its political parties to maintain direction to the outside world, but it may easily change when long awaited freedom will come to life. According to the beliefs of Kamelists governing Turkey religious homogeneity is essential to Turkey's long-term security, how than the Turks, including the extremist factions, are expected to adopt and live within free society of the EU without posing harm to that society and without militant approach to conversion of European Christians into Islam?

About the Author

Arkadiusz is a doctoral candidate at the Rutgers University Graduate Division of Global Affairs.